Monday, May 30, 2011

Does FAPE trump LRE? Trick(y) Question

Special needs education transport services in ...Image via Wikipedia
 My most recent post in the Special Education Law 101 series now running on the blog concerned least restrictive environment.  LRE is one of the most misunderstood concepts in the field of special education law. Some people in audiences where I have given speeches are amazed that the words "inclusion" and "mainstreaming" are not in IDEA or the regulations. 

Mainstreaming is a movement or a goal, but not a legal requirement.  There is clearly a preference for mainstreaming under IDEA, but it is not required that every child be in a regular education classroom. The requirement is the least restrictive environment appropriate for an individual child.

Last summer I was on a panel at a conference addressing this issue, and the question was asked does the FAPE requirement trump the LRE requirement?  The panel agreed that FAPE does trump LRE.  I need to revise my answer in retrospect.  FAPE does not trump LRE.  FAPE trumps inclusion if they are in conflict.  But FAPE and LRE cannot technically be in conflict, because the LRE requirement only requires mainstreaming to the extent that it is appropriate for the child. If a child cannot be successfully educated in the regular classroom with the use of supplementary aids and services, LRE is someplace else.  So my revised answer is that FAPE does not trump LRE; they stand as the twin towers of special education law!

Any questions?
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Thursday, May 26, 2011

Special Education Law 101 - Part IV

Least TernImage by Alan Vernon. via Flickr
. The Requirement of LRE (least restrictive environment)

The IDEA also requires that to the “…maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities … are educated with children who are not disabled, and special classes, separate schooling or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular education environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.”    IDEA, § 612(a)(5).  See, 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.114 to 300.119.

The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the issue of LRE, but a number of Circuit Courts of appeal have provided some guidance.  For example, the Fifth Circuit has developed a two pronged analysis: the first question is whether education of the student with a disability in the regular classroom, with the use of supplemental aids and services, can be satisfactorily achieved, and if it cannot, whether the school district has provided the student with interaction with non-disabled peers to the maximum extent appropriate.  Daniel RR v. State Board of Education 874 F.2d 1036,  441 IDELR 433 (5th Cir. 1989). 

     The Ninth Circuit has developed four factors which must be balanced to determine the LRE placement: (1) the educational benefits available to the student in a regular classroom, supplemented with appropriate aids and services, as compared with the educational benefits of a special education classroom; (2) the non-academic benefits of interaction with children who were not disabled; (3) the effect of the student's presence on the teacher and other children in the classroom; and (4) the cost of mainstreaming the student in a regular classroom. Sacramento City Sch Dist v. Rachel H by Holland 14 F.3d 1398, 20 IDELR 812 (9th Cir. 01/24/1994).

          The Fourth Circuit has stated the rule this way: “The Act's language obviously indicates a strong congressional preference for mainstreaming. Mainstreaming, however, is not appropriate for every handicapped child …The proper inquiry is whether a proposed placement is appropriate under the Act. In some cases, a placement which may be considered better for academic reasons may not be appropriate because of the failure to provide for mainstreaming… In a case where the segregated facility is considered superior, the court should determine whether the services which make that placement superior could be feasibly provided in a non-segregated setting. If they can, the placement in the segregated school would be inappropriate under the Act. Framing the issue in this manner accords the proper respect for the strong preference in favor of mainstreaming while still realizing the possibility that some handicapped children simply must be educated in segregated facilities either because the handicapped child would not benefit from mainstreaming, because any marginal benefits received from mainstreaming are far outweighed by the benefits gained from services which could not feasibly be provided in the non-segregated setting, or because the handicapped child is a disruptive force in the non-segregated setting.”  DeVries v. Fairfax County Sch Bd 882 F.2d 876, 441 IDELR 555 (Fourth Cir. 1989)

LRE and FAPE are the twin towers of special education law.





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Saturday, May 21, 2011

Is It Good Policy to Eliminate 43 Education Programs?

Duncan HunterImage via Wikipedia
Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-CA), chairman of the Subcommittee on Early Childhood, Elementary, and Secondary Education introduced a bill last week that would eliminate 43 federal education programs.  Here is a link to his announcement. Here is the list of the programs to be eliminated with short descriptions.

The council for Exceptional Children has taken a position against the bill and asking its members to contact their congressional representatives to oppose the bill.  Here is their release.

What is you opinion of this bill?
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Saturday, May 14, 2011

Special Education Law 101 - Part III

SpecialImage by Brandon Doran via Flickr
In the previous posts in this series we have looked at the sources of special education law and discussed the critical concept of FAPE.  Today we look at some important decisions by U. S. Courts of Appeal taking FAPE in some new directions:

In Deal v. Hamilton County 392 F.3d 840, 42 IDELR 109 (6th Cir. 1//16/04), the Sixth Circuit held that where the school district had already predetermined the student’s program and services before the IEP Team meeting, the parents were denied the opportunity to meaningfully participate in the IEP process.  Accordingly, the district denied FAPE for the student.   

          In Shore Regional High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S. 381 F.3d 194, 41 IDELR 234 (3d Cir. 8/30/04), the Third Circuit held that a school district’s failure to stop bullying may constitute a denial of FAPE.  Despite repeated complaints by the parents the bullying continued; the student became depressed and the school district developed an IEP.  The harassment continued and the student attempted suicide.  The Third Circuit agreed with the hearing officer that the unabated harassment and bullying made it impossible for the student to receive FAPE.

          In Lillbask ex rel Mauclaire v. State of Connecticut Dept. of Educ.  397 F.3d 77, 42 IDELR 230 (2d Cir. 2/2/05), the Second Circuit ruled that an IDEA hearing officer has the authority to review IEP safety concerns.  The court provided an expansive interpretation of the jurisdiction of the hearing officer, ruling that Congress intended the hearing officer to have authority over any subject matter that could involve a denial of or interference with a student’s
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Sunday, May 8, 2011

Nice Visit in Phoenix

PHOENIX, AZ - APRIL 30:  Relief pitcher Carlos...Image by Getty Images via @daylife

I just got back from a conference in Phoenix.  It is nice to get to see a bunch of people who I like and work with all at the same time.  Thank you all for your company.  It was a great time.

I especially enjoy meeting the many readers of this blog who came up to me and introduced themselves.  It is always a thrill to meet our readers.  One reader actually recognized me from my photo on the blog. See there, this refutes definitely the argument that I have heard that my high school picture decorates the blog and that Ii am actually now much older.  Ha!

So thanks to everybody for helping me enjoy the experience.

One complaint:  Long time readers know that my only sports addiction is the Cubs.   Why do the Diamondbacks feel they are justified in doubling their ticket prices when the Chicago Cubs are in town?  By the way the Nationals do the same thing when the Cubs play in DC.  I'm pretty sure that these "prime games" violate my constitutional rights.  It is interesting how there are so many blue Cubs jerseys in these other baseball parks, but supply and demand only should go so far!  Free the long-suffering Cub fans!

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Tuesday, May 3, 2011

Special Education Law 101 - Part II

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A.   The Requirement of  FAPE (free and appropriate public education)

The basic requirement of the IDEA is that states and school districts must have in effect policies and procedures that ensure that children with a disability receive a free and appropriate public education, hereafter sometimes referred to as “FAPE.” IDEA, § 612(a)(1).

The IDEA defines “child with a disability” as a child:
(i)with mental retardation, hearing impairments…, speech or language impairments, visual impairments…, serious emotional disturbance, orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific learning disabilities; and
(ii)who by reason thereof, needs special education and related services.
              IDEA, § 602(3)


     The IDEA defines “FAPE” as:

special education and related services that:
(A)  have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and  without charge;
(B)  meet the standards of the State educational agency;
(C)  include an appropriate preschool, elementary school or secondary school education in the state involved; and
(D)  are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required (…hereunder.).
IDEA, § 602(9).  See also 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.101 to 300.113.


     The IDEA defines “special education” as:

Specially designed instruction, at no cost to the parents, to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability, including
(A)    instruction conducted in the classroom, in the home, in hospitals and institutions, and in other settings; and
(B)    instruction in physical education.
IDEA, § 602(29).


          The Supreme Court of the United States issued the seminal decision interpreting the provisions of the IDEA in the case of  Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Bd. of Ed. v. Rowley 455 U.S. 175, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 553 IDELR 656 (1982).  The facts of the case were that the student had a hearing impairment.  The parents requested that the schools provide a sign language interpreter for all of the student’s academic classes.  Although the child was performing better than the average child in her class and easily advancing from grade to grade, she was not performing consistent with her academic potential. Rowley, supra, 102 S.Ct at 3039-3040.

          Holding that FAPE required a potential maximizing standard, the District Court ruled in favor of the student.  The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.  See, Rowley, 102 S.Ct. at 3040.

          The Supreme Court reversed.  Rowley, supra, 102 S.Ct at 3052.  After a review of the legislative history of the Act and the cases leading to Congressional passage of the Act, the Supreme Court held that the Congress did not intend to impose a potential-maximizing standard, but rather, intended to open the door of education to disabled students by requiring a basic floor of opportunity. Rowley, supra, 102 S.Ct at 3043-3051.

          The Supreme Court noted that the individualized Educational Program, hereafter sometimes referred to as the “IEP,” is the cornerstone of the Act’s requirement of FAPE. Rowley, supra, 102 S.Ct at 3038, 3049.  The Court also notes with approval the many procedural safeguards imposed upon the schools by the Act.  Rowley, supra, 102 S.Ct at 3050-3051.  The Court also cautioned the lower courts  that they are not to substitute their “…own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review.” Rowley, supra, 102 S.Ct at 3051.

          The Supreme Court held that instead of requiring a potential maximizing standard, FAPE is satisfied where the education is sufficient to confer some educational benefit to the student with a disability.  Rowley, supra, 102 S.Ct at 3048.  Accordingly, the Court concludes that the IDEA requires “…access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the …” child with a disability. Rowley, supra, 102 S.Ct at 3048.

          The Supreme Court instructed lower courts that the inquiry in cases alleging denial of FAPE should be twofold:  First, have the schools “…complied with the procedures set forth in the Act? And second, is the individualized educational program developed through the Act’s procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.”  Rowley, supra, 102 S.Ct. at 3051.

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