One Circuit has applied the new rule regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies for special education cases announced by the Supreme Court in Fry v Napoleon Community Schs 69 IDELR 116, 137 S.Ct. 742, 580 U.S. _____ (2/22/17). You can read our previous posts about the Supreme Court decision here, here and here.
The Eighth Circuit in JM by McCauley v Francis Howell Sch Dist, No 16-1756, 69 IDELR 146 (8th Cir 3/7/17) affirmed the district court decision dismissing the parent's ADA/§504/§1983 claims because the parent did not first exhaust administrative remedies. The parent contended that the district violated IDEA and the other statutes and constitutional provisions by placing the student repeatedly in seclusion and by improperly using restraints. The parent later amended her complaint to remove the IDEA and state common law claims.
The Eighth Circuit stated:
"The IDEA’s exhaustion requirement also applies to claims under the
Constitution, the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and other federal laws protecting
children with disabilities to the extent those claims seek relief “that is also available
under [the IDEA].” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l); Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. School, No. 15-497,
2017 WL 685533, at *8 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2017)...After argument in this case, the Supreme
Court held that “‘relief that is also available’ under the IDEA” means “relief for the
denial of a FAPE, because that is the only ‘relief’ the IDEA makes ‘available.’” Fry,
2017 WL 685533, at *8. Thus, “exhaustion is not necessary when the gravamen of
the plaintiff’s suit is something other than the denial of the IDEA’s core
guarantee—what the Act calls a ‘free appropriate public education.’” Id., at *3,
quoting § 1412(a)(1)(A)."
In analyzing whether the parent's complaint concerned FAPE, the Eighth Circuit reasoned as follows: "Considering “substance, not surface,” the district court did not err in finding
the complaint seeks relief for denial of a FAPE under the IDEA. Id., at *11. The
second amended complaint states, “At all times mentioned above, [J.M.] was entitled
to the educational services and protections available under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act of 1975” and “at all times[J.M. was] entitled to reasonable
accommodations” for his disabilities. It alleges that “[b]etween February 2014 and
September 5, 2014, J.M. was placed in physical restraints for half of the time he
actually spent at Defendant’s schools.” It further states that J.M. was “denied . . .
because of his disability, participation in and the benefits of a public education.”
These allegations show that the complaint was based on the “denial of a FAPE” under
the IDEA. See id., at *13 (determining the Fry’s complaint “alleges only disability based
discrimination” and “contains no allegation . . accus[ing] the school even in
general terms of refusing to provide the educational instruction and services that E.F.
needs”)... The complaint here is not based on
disability discrimination. Except for Count IV (the MHRA claim), the complaint
does not use the word “discrimination.” Rather, the complaint is based on how the
use of isolation and physical restraints failed to provide proper “sufficient ‘supportive
services’ to permit [J.M.] to benefit from . . . instruction,” id., at *4, and ultimately
“denied [J.M.] . . . the benefits of public education.” Finally, although McCauley did
not “invoke[] the IDEA’s formal procedures to handle the dispute,” “the history of the
-6-
proceedings,” including her initial complaint and first amended complaint contained
claims under the IDEA, which is “[a] further sign that the gravamen of [the] suit is
the denial of a FAPE.” See id., at *13." (emphasis added).
After concluding that no exception to the exhaustion requirement was applicable, the Eighth Circuit dismissed the claim.
You can read the entire Eighth Circuit decision here.
So what do you think of this ruling?